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This thesis is a study of Japan's emerging role as a
regional arms exporter and the associated linkages of resource
scarcity, economic vulnerability, and security dependency.
Evidence is provided for analysis of Japan's approach
to each of these factors and the strategic implications for
the major actors of this region. The conclusions are that
Japan is emphasizing an increased military capability asso-
ciated with threat perceptions of the Soviet Union and that
one economical approach to rearming Japan is for it to
become an arms exporter to the Pacific Basin region.
It is also shown that the pursuit of an independent
military course for Japan will not occur in the near future,
but that the American- Japanese relationship will undergo
changes directed at greater autonomy for Japan.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY
Japan enjoyed a unique position in the world prior to
the October 1973 war between the Arab and Israeli factions
in the Middle East. This position was one of political
fence-sitting and of propagating a foreign policy that
supported and protected an enormous but vulnerable economy.
The events of 1973 and more recent events of political
instability, economic uncertainty, and increased Soviet
aggression have combined with an inauspicious perception of
American international will to create a mixture that has
awakened and stirred the security interests of the sleeping
Japanese giant.
Japan's leadership had perceived their role in the
Pacific Basin as apolitical. But the realization that
Japan is the keystone between the world's supreme nuclear
powers, its largest economies, its leaders in communist
ideology and its strongest democracy, and that they all
face potential conflict over competition for political
and economic influence, world-wide, has helped reshape
Japan's egoistic perception of itself. The national
interests of these regional actors (the United States,
the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China) all
have a profound effect on the direction and degree of
Japanese political, economic and military reactions in the
future.

China is attempting a modernization program that is
designed to prepare it for a new place in the world order.
To accomplish this, China is turning away from its Asian-
centrism cocoon and flexing its economic and military wings.
The Soviet Union, influenced by paranoic fears of being
completely surrounded by imperialistic capitalists with
immense industrial capabilities, continues to practice at
hegemonic adventurism. The United States' interests are
no longer centered on the low-threat, off-shore environments
that demand only modest commitments of U. S. forces for
protection. Japan is a major world economic power with a
diversity of trading partners and markets that require pro-
tection. The giant has rubbed the sleep from its eyes and
has come to assume that to ensure its economic security,
it must possess a military power commensurate with its
commercial power.
It is now up to the United States to assess and respond
to this renewed perception of military power in Japan.
The options must be explored and the action taken cannot
be tentative. The purpose of this thesis is to examine
the alternatives Japan has on this road toward rearmament
and the implications in relationship to the options Japan
can take.
In very general terms, Japan has two options: to
solely rely on the U',.S , -Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty for

security and continued dependency on its western ally for
an indefinite period; or Japan can maintain the security
treaty while progressing toward a position of increased
self-reliance on indigenous sources of production and man-
power for its security, continuing to seek viable diplomatic
alternatives. Either option necessitates an exploration of
certain variables. This thesis will explore the variables
associated with resource accessibility and security, and
the political acceptability, both internationally and
domestically, of the security options confronting Japan.
The investigation of these variables will analyze
evidence for the hypothesis that because of Japan's geo-
economic position in the world and its enormous stake in
maintaining international stability, Japan will overcome
the political objections to accepting more responsibility
for its security and the economic cost associated with
each plateau on this climb toward increasing indigenous
defense. It will also demonstrate that Japan increasingly
accepts the proposition that progress toward this pinnacle
is essential for the protection of its security and its
national interests in the international economy.

II. JAPANESE ATTITUDES TOWARD SECURITY
"Rich Country, Strong Army" - Meiji Slogan
It can be said with certainty that Japanese domestic
attitudes toward security have changed dramatically since
October 1973. Some factors that have influenced this atti-
tude realignment are:
. The Arab oil embargo and accompanied crisis
. A withdrawal of U. S. troops from the Pacific
Basin to one-half the pre-Vietnam intervention
level
. The U. S.- China rapprochement with Taiwanese
implications
. An announcement of the "swing strategy" (flexible
response) for U. S. forces from the Pacific Basin
to Western Europe in the event of a crisis
. Soviet imperialistic aggression and hegemonic
adventurism in the Pacific Basin and in the
oceans adjacent to Japan
. The lack of a resolution to the northern terri-
tories situation
. A military build-up in North Korea
. International political instability
. The Iranian revolution and American reaction
. The penetration of Japanese air defense perimeter
by a Soviet pilot in a MIG-25 Foxbat
. The Soviet-Vietnamese Peace and Friendship Treaty
These are factors that are shaping current Japanese domestic
attitudes on defense, but before the current status on

security is explained further, it is necessary to under-
stand and investigate the recent past of Japanese defense
perceptions concerning the issues associated with national
security.
A. BACKGROUND
The Japanese views on defense issues in the past have
appeared to be diverse in nature, but with certain common
factors that resulted in a defense decision-making attitude
characterized by acquiescence. These factors were:
Post-1945 apprehensions . The emotional wounds of ' .
Japan's defeat in World War II were wide and deep.
The leadership of post-1945 Japan had doubts con-
cerning the utilization of military power as a means
to achieving political ends internationally. Even
those who still adhered to the Meiji principles of
Samurai origin and placed great importance on mill- .
tary matters had to assent to the attitudes of the
majority, modifying their views for the sake of
presenting a united front through acquiescence.
Decline of militaristic values . With the American
occupation forces came a Japanese government dominated
by civilian leaders. The old martial virtues that
lead to conflict, patriotism, discipline and self-
denial were too recent to forget. Resources had
been shifted away from the military sector for
societal welfare.
No external threat perception . Japan enjoyed a unique
position in the world that lasted for three decades.
Japan's national interests were not endangered by any
external threat, it perceived no enemies, the economy
flourished and the cost for this security was nominal.
The only threat that was perceived during the post-
1945 to October 1973 period was the Korean War^ , but
even its impact was offset by the economic advantages
gained by supplying U.N. armies with materials at low
cost (less transportation) and Japan's alliance with
America. Also during this period (1945-1973) the
10

Japanese were preoccupied with their ostrich syndrome -
if no threat is perceived, then there is no threat.
It was not necessary to think about threats to security
during this period as long as the Japanese were willing
to place credence in the U. S. security guarantee.
Constitutional constraints . The American occupation,
the only occupation by foreigners, was not popular,
but the constitutional restraint on offensive military
forces and equipment met with public approval, as did
the limits imposed on expenditures for military items.
This allowed investments in capital items, increased
economic growth and a high standard of living.
A negative reaction by Pacific trading partners . The
members of ASEAN (Association of South East Asian
Nations) and Japan's other Pacific Basin trading partners
have expressed apprehension concerning a prospect of
revival of a militaristic Japan. Japanese business
leaders would enjoy a more secure military position but
are conservative in nature and respond to the desires
of their foreign associates.-^
American/Soviet/Chinese detente and diplomacy . In the
past American detente efforts were believed to have
reduced the prospects of war, thus reducing Japan's
need for indigenous security. The U. S. -Chinese
rapprochement also lessened the necessity for activism
on defense issues in the Japanese government.
These pre-1973 defense attitudes expressed by the above
factors are indicators of a Japanese defense policy that
was announced in May 1957. Although many of these attitudes
are prevalent today, they are not a consensus any longer.
The recent events in and around the Pacific Basin have
altered Japanese attitudes regarding the security force




The Japanese first acknowledged a change in threat per-
ception in their 1978 Defense White Paper: "Both in Europe
and the Far East, the strength of Soviet forces now sur-
passes that of the U. S." Today a new national consensus
on defense and security issues is developing in Japan.
The factors responsible for this perception transformation
were stated clearly at the beginning of this chapter. The
following statistical data are supportive of this recent
perception transformation.
Once a year the Prime Minister' s office conducts a survey
on Japanese attitudes toward the self defense force. Here
are the results for 1973 and 1979.
Question: Should the SDF be retained? 1973 - 73% of
respondents favored retention, 12% v;ere in ~
opposition to retention, and 15% had no opinion. In 1979,
86% favored retention of the SDF, 10% opposed retention,
and 13% had no opinion.
Question: How do you think Japan should protect its
security? 1972 - 41% favored maintaining present U. S.-
Japan security agreement and SDF, 16% opposed both, and
12% wanted treaty terminated and SDF bolstered, while
31% expressed no opinion.
In 1979, 50% favored present agreement, 6% opposed both,
but 23% wanted the SDF strengthened, while only 21




What factors have affected this dramatic transformation
in Japanese domestic attitudes toward security and their
alliance with the United States? In the past, Japanese
defense decision-making was hampered by the psychological
wounds that had been inflicted on their leaders and the
political scars associated with the post-war atmosphere
of Japan. Three popular attitudes of the post-war period
have undergone an alteration since 1973:
1) Concern regarding a revival of militarism and
its feared consequences has diminished.
'
2) The utility of military power in the international
and domestic environments has gained popular
publicity.
8
3) Japan no longer feels safe in the conviction that
as long as it does not engage in rearming or in
foreign military entanglements, it is threatened
by no external enemies.
All of these factors are relevant, but the third factor,
a decline in the belief that future security is assured so
long as Japan's overt foreign policies are perceived as
pacific in nature, has had the most profound effect on
domestic attitudes. Associated with this new feeling of
insecurity is the perception of projected military intentions
of the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, in the event of a war.
Japan (along with other nations within this region) is now
facing the political realism of the expanded activity and
scope of Soviet presence. The importance of this factor is
receiving more genuine examination vis a vis the nuclear
and conventional canopy offered by the United States.
13

Soviet objectives and diplomacy focus on Tokyo in North-
east Asia. By using intimidating tactics, reinforced by
frequent displays of Soviet air and naval superiority
adjacent to or within Japanese territorial sea and air
space, they have attempted to impress the Japanese body
politic. But the political results the Kremlin had hoped
to gain by their display of bold "Soviet Diplomacy" have
instead only intensified tensions between the Soviet
Union and Japan, and magnified Japanese public support for
the U. S. -Japanese Mutual Security Treaty.
Japanese defensive concerns have increased in recent
months with the deployments of the Minsk and the Ivan Rogov
to the Pacific Fleet base out of Vladivostok, Backfire
bomber deployments to Kamchatka, and increases in Soviet
ground forces (between 10,000 and 12,000) on the new military
bases located less than 40 miles from the Hokkaido coast
on the Kurile Islands of Kunishiri and Etorofu. Of concern
throughout this region is the basing of Bear reconnaissance
aircraft in Danang and the Soviet naval use of Cam Ranh Bay.
The Japanese Defense White Paper of 1979 expresses anxiety
over the Soviet's use of Vietnamese bases: "Especially,
if the Soviet military forces intend permanent use of
airports, harbors, and other facilities in Indo-China, it
will affect the military balance between the U. S. and the
U.S.S.R. ... It will not only affect the peace of that area
14

and the safety of Japan's sea lines of communications, but
also will impose restrictions on activities of the Western
countries in areas surrounding the area. Japan, therefore,
has a concern over the utilization of airports, harbors,
and other facilities in Indo-China by the Soviet military
forces."
With public opinion now strongly in favor of maintaining
a Self Defense Force and a reaffirmation of the utility and
value of the U. S. alliance, Japan would be able to proceed
with a revitalization of both its defense relations with
the United States, and a qualitative build-up of its
indigenous defense structure, which will allow Japan to more
effectively cope with limited or small scale invasions.
The facts being as they are, the logical question of
interest to the majority of international studies scholars
is: what concrete steps are being initiated in Japan to
integrate these facts into action? In examining this
question one may find clues to the answer in the character
of the Japanese people and their leaders.
The Japanese culture, like that of China, has its
foundations in the traditional ritual concepts of its
ancestors. And like the Chinese, the Japanese had (prior to
their defeat in World War II) a perception of Japan as the
central power figure in Asia and conceivably the world.
This could be termed the Yamato Concept. This concept
15

was introduced into Japanese culture sometime during the
seventh century A.D. Apparently the Japanese had a need for
a more complex form of government and decided to borrow it
from their highly civilized and sophisticated neighbors,
the Chinese. The new form of government was based on the
"Son of Heaven" concept with an imperial bureaucracy based
on competitive examination. At this time a clan system had
been the government in Japan and it was not long before the
dominant Yamato clan chief ascended to the position of
emperor, a direct descendent of "the Sun Goddess." This
centralized governmental concept was not the only thing the
Japanese borrowed from China, but it is the object of this
discussion.
The object is the Japanese concept of a "divine land."
This concept has developed over the centuries and had to be
a factor at the start of World War II. The Japanese, partly
due to the insularity of their physical geographic position
in the Pacific Basin, and in part due to their religious and
governmental concepts, believe that each plant, animal,
person and nation-state has its proper place or station in
life. Japan's place or station in life or the world order
is as the political, economic and now because of the two
preceding positions, military guide for the Pacific Basin and
Northeast Asia. The concept is directly linked to the
Yamato Concept of government and is being rehabilitated today
16

There is still another factor that is persuasive today in
Japan: the Meiji restoration. This period, which began in
early 1868, lead to a succession of reformations that even-
tually modernized the political and social structure of Japan.
There are many elements of the Meiji period that are
still evident today. The Meiji leaders recognized that pro-
gression in the industrial sector could not be sustained
without a supporting infrastructure. This infrastructure
encompassed the sectors of mass education, based on American
and German designs; a bank system based on Western design,
and a modern transportation system. The Japanese, during
the Meiji restoration, turned to the West, as their ancestors
had turned toward China centuries before.
A slogan during the Meiji period was quoted at the be-
ginning of this chapter. The latter portion of the slogan,
"strong army," refers to Japanese problems of national security
There was great emphasis placed on military matters by Meiji
leaders. A national desire during this period, as there is
today, was the attainment of industrial and technological
equality with the West.
This national goal of equality with the West lead to an
expansionistic foreign policy in pre-war Japan, spearheaded
by the Greater East Asia Co -Prosperity Sphere. This pre-
war foreign policy had been succeeded by an acquiescent
omnidirectional policy after the defeat of World War II that
17

was imperialistic from an economic perspective. The Japanese
now have economic and industrial linkages not only in East
Asia but with almost every major industrial power and with a
variety o£ third world raw material sources. The Japanese
economic hold on some western economies is considered, by
some, to be quite strong and potentially dangerous.
Economic imperialism can also be considered economic
diversification. Since the Japanese do not have a military
force to protect their vital interests overseas, they have
had to modify their foreign policy in order to gain some
security for the continued flow of natural resources,
especially oil. Their omnidirectional foreign policy now
includes the Middle East. Japan's program of economic
diversification incorporates Japanese control of indigenous
oil production in this region. To date the success of this
12program has been limited. But through financial and tech-
nological investments in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Basin,
Japan hopes to increase its autonomous supplies of energy.
The goal, an attainment of 30% of domestic requirements from
Japanese owned or operated foreign sources, has an achieve-
ment target date of 1985.
The decades of modernization (four) that are associated
with the Meiji period can be compared to the decades of
restoration following World War II. There is an analogy here,
but is there a direct linkage between the two periods? Will
18

the armed forces of Japan again politically dominate the
government as they did during the decades that followed the
Meiji restoration? Will there be an expansionistic foreign
policy leading to control of the vital resources Japan depends
on so absolutely?
Indicators of Japan's movement toward a government domi-
nated by military thought and leaders are difficult to
detect. Even steps toward a modernization of the SDF (Self
Defense Force) could be debated because of the duality and
vacillation in almost every domestic and international policy
the Japanese government pursues. One reason for this vacil-
lation of policy in Japan is cultural in context and the other
is constitutional. There is a cultural trait in the Japanese
people that cannot be dismissed. This is duality of person-
ality. The Japanese generally are very peaceful and contem-
plative in nature. They enjoy and employ the artistic ability
they have in all areas of their cultural spectrum. Yet there
is a dichotomy to this nature of Japan's life and culture.
They can at times be violent and atrocious in their actions.
This is one reason, but it is only part of the total question
on governmental policy vacillation.
The other reason is that since World War II there has not
been a charismatic leader that could unite the different
party factions. Most leaders in Japan do not come from an
individual party for this reason, but attain their positions
19

through the bureaucratic process. This period of factionalism
and vacillation in government lead to the ultra-nationalist
assassinations of the 1930 's and to a military coup that
followed. What options does Japan have today, when many of
the problems today may have linkages with the problems of the
past? Are the options any different?
C. JAPAN!S OPTIONS
Except for China, Japan now has, by far, the largest
military budget in Asia. Although Japan still remains
near the politically acceptable limit of 11 of the gross
national product for military expenditures, the 1979 expen-
ditures were over $9.5 billion, placing Japan in the top
ten for military expenditures worldwide.
In the past ten years, Japan's military budget had
increased at an average rate of 81 per year. At first
glance, one could attribute this increase to worldwide i
economic inflation. When the increase is contrasted to a
NATO budget decrease of 2% per year over the same period,
various conclusions can be drawn. In 1978 the Japanese
military budget was only 0.91 of the gross national product,
but the figure equates to over 51 of the Japanese national
budget. -^^
The 1978 Japanese defense report (the White Paper)
strongly stated that they no longer believe the United
States Seventh Fleet is capable of protecting Japanese sea
20

lines, and therefore oil supplies against Soviet interdic-
tion. This is a crucial factor for Japan: the Japanese
have no natural resources except for solar and tidal power,
and they rely entirely on shipping for oil/mineral/material
1
8
imports and a majority of commercial exports.
The decade of the 1980 's will provide Japan with the
opportunity to make some critical choices concerning its
national security. The spectrum is wide and so are the
choices. But one fact remains clear, no matter which choice
Japan accepts or, because of circumstances is forced to
accept, the options will clearly have an economic aspect to
them. The options range from total unilateral military
disarmament on one extreme of the spectrum to offensive
nuclear rearmament on the other extreme.
In any examination of Japan's options for security in
the future, one must be aware of another Japanese cultural
trait that will influence any decision - a strong preference
for the status quo. This preference enables them to con-
centrate their limited resources in the sector of their
society that they receive the most benefit from. Japan,
like all industrial nations, is concerned with its continued
prosperity and its potential for growth in the future. Yet
like other industrial nations, it must face the reality that
there may be limits to growth and that the world's natural
resources are, as yet, vague and undetermined.
21

If one were to make a list of possible options for Japan's
future, two factors would have to be considered: Japan's
economic and military security and the U. S.- Japanese defense
relationship. The current Japanese policies toward these
questions may only be short-run palliatives. But in a
changing world the Japanese cannot honestly be faulted for
this. They certainly have not let a false sense of com-
placency surround them, but instead have a sense of uneasi-
ness as they look to the future. They will certainly
examine all options rigorously.
As viewed from an economic perspective, economic
because any option taken or accepted by the Japanese will
have economic as well as military consequences, there are
four basic options open to the Japanese under two general
and opposing assumptions of world order. One assumption is
a world order in which the nation-states are in competition
for diminishing resources and the level of competition is
escallated as resource scarcity increases. The other
assumption is that the world order will become more cooper-
ative in nature, sharing access to the limited resources
on an equitable basis. Operating within this framework,
19there are four alternatives for Japan to be analyzed.
These alternatives are not mutually exclusive, but are,
to some degree, interdependent, overlapping and reciprocal
in nature, with no sharp distinction between them.
22

Option One: Maintaining the Status Quo
This option is characteristic of past Japanese poli-
tical approaches. Letting the inertia of the status quo
dictate the choice. This option also relies entirely
on an "iron clad" alliance system, a system that would
demand a certain amount of accommodation on Japan's part.
One major obstacle to this approach is acquiring an ally
willing to jeopardize its own national interests and
survival for the status quo and security of Japan.
Non-action on Japan's part has great appeal for the
Japanese because it is an evasive option. They see
their alternatives sharply constricted by their fragile
vulnerabilities and humiliating reliance on international
goodwill and cooperation. However, the age of anonymity
is gone for the Japanese. They cannot risk the survival
of their nation and their accustomed high living standard
to the interests and capricious actions of aliens.
Option Two: Self-Sufficiency through Cooperation
A major portion of the world leaders have spoken out
in favor of a worldwide cooperative effort to share
access to scarce raw materials. However, these same
leaders have maintained that they will not permit their
nations to be held hostage by foreign powers for want of
a strategic commodity. This modified policy of self-
sufficiency means that any nation adhering to it must
23

be flexible and allow for possible shifts in the world
order. Japan cannot afford this luxury. Japan cannot
20
be isolationist for much more than 100 days. There
is little within the country which might sustain it.
This option does not seem viable for an extended period
of time.
Option Three: Import/Export Cooperation
Japan has long been an advocate of, but not a sub-
scriber to, free trade. Their philosophy, like that of
other developed nations, has been to maximize gains from
the export of manufactured products while simultaneously
placing protectionist impediments on manufactured imports
which might be injurious to their economic development.
Their rationale for these actions was both nationalistic
and protectionist in nature. But no matter what label
was given to the policy, the fact remained that the
Japanese were not going to let foreign investments in Japan
weaken their control over their own economic destiny. The
validity of this argument became more difficult for Japan's
competitors to accept as Japan's economy developed into the
world's leading economy.
As the worldwide concern for scarce resources cul-
minates, Japan will perceive a new world economic role
for itself. The realization that its greatest and most
vulnerable weakness is not foreign control of its economy
24

but its reliance on a reliable flow of commercial and
industrial raw materials will lead to Japan's advocacy
of more equitable two-way free trade.
This option requires increasing amounts of cooper-
ation worldwide and has long-term consequences for Japan's
economy. Essentials in this paragonic option are freedom
for peaceful and equitable transactions without the ob-
structions of regionalism or hegemonic self-interests.
For Japan this could equally mean a real threat of
foreign control for its economy.
Global interests of the various nations on this
planet make the prospects for such a Utopian option
extremely poor. U. S. -Japanese cooperation can be assumed
for the near future, but Japanese-European cooperation is
another matter. There are dangerously competitive relations
between the economies of Western Europe and Japan. Each
views the other as a threat. The result is an atmosphere
less than conducive to generating any real cooperation over
access to strategic and scarce resources. This situation
leaves only one remaining option to be explored.
Option Four: Remilitarization of Japan
Japan could be confronted with eventual resource
problems that are analogous to the pre-war adversities
it faced and could once again consider the alternatives
of rearmament followed by territorial expansion as a
25

means o£ security for the desired control of essential
raw materials. This action could, but would not have to
be, accompanied by a renewed right wing, ultra-nationalistic
militarism. A decade ago someone with this same idea would
have been labeled unrealistic but today many of the arguments
that were used to invalidate this theory are slowly
disappearing:
The memories of Japan's stinging defeat are still vivid .
This argument dominates much of the literature, past and
present, often ignoring the facts of Japanese history and
the present world situation. Japanese history demonstrates
that Japan has been willing to resort to military action
as a means of solving international disputes in the past.
As a national policy of the past this is not easily over-
21looked. More recent international events have also faded
the so-called psychological aversion to the use of military
force. These events, spanning a time frame from the Korean
War and including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have
incontrovertibly eroded the memories of Japan's defeat at
the hands of its present ally, the United States.
The strength of the pacifist in the LDP is too strong .
With 30^ of the Russian military forces stationed in the
Far East and more than 11,000 Soviet troops in the
22Northern Territories, the last thing anyone should be
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concerned with is strong pacifism in the Japanese body-
politic. Just the opposite is true; concern should be
focused on the changes in military attitude taking place
in the Japanese government that are guiding Japan toward
a new role of leadership in East Asia - not solely based
on economic power.
In the past there has been a public reluctance to
the discussion of military matters, but recent indications
of a change in the public attitude is apparent. Japanese
officials now openly discuss such matters and even refer to
the Self-Defense force as separate branches. Army, Navy
and Air Force. Other indications of a strong right wing
element in the government are discussions of doubling the
defense budget on the Diet floor, along with the building
of an ASW fleet of aircraft carriers and nuclear weapons
development. It is public discussions of this type that
less than two years ago were responsible for the then
Chief of Staff, General Hiroomi Kurisu, being released
23from active service.
The reaction to Japanese rearmament would probably
be negative from its Asian neighbors and the global
community . This argument is often used against remili-
tarization of Japan. The American collective security
system desires a Japan more capable of autonomous defense.
This would assist the "system" in coping with expanded
27

Soviet military power in the region and possibly alleviate
the requirement for a "swing strategy" - a strategy that
neither Japan nor NATO Europe have much faith in for the
obvious reason that the Seventh Fleet offers little more
than power projection, has limited strategic value and during
a conflict could easily be incapacitated in transit from the
Pacific Basin to the European theater.
Chinese leaders have also expressed their concern in
regards to Japanese rearmament. In fact, the Chinese
have made a startling attitude transformation toward
24Japan's approach to rearmament. China's political
-
military environment has shown growing support for an
enlarged Japanese defense base and effort. This change
in attitude, on China's part, could be related to Peking's
desire to acquire Japanese weapons and defense related
technology.
Many of the Asian leaders have begun to speak out
on Japan's changing military position in Asia. Some have
expressed "no alarm" concerning Japan's new posture,
with the qualifier that it remain conventional. Perhaps
the most significant comment made to date was first
expressed publicly by China's Vice Chairman Teng Hsiao-ping
(Deng Xiao-ping) in September 1978. Speaking to a
Japanese delegation in Peking, Teng said, "I am in favor
of Japan's self-defense force build-up." Other Asian
28

leaders have also publicly endorsed Japan's recent
Defense White Paper (1979) , which clearly perceives the
Soviet Union as a direct threat to Japan and its Asian
neighbors
.
The price for this unreserved oratory in the Pacific
Asian community has been high. Backfire bombers are
now stationed in Kamchatka, there are new Soviet bases on
the Kuril Islands and Bear reconnaissance aircraft are
now based out of Danang and the former U. S. naval base at
Cam Ranh Bay. The signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace
and Friendship Treaty in August 1978 also had its
associated and resultant effects. This action may have
prompted Moscow to sign the Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation with Vietnam only three months after the
signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty.
Obviously there have been substantial changes in the
international environment since the early 1950 's when Japan
started its initial rearmament effort. Japan's defense
expenditures have fluctuated from near 31 of GNP to as low
25
as .77% of GNP during this period, conceivably this could
be a barometric indication of past world political stability
and could perhaps forecast or indicate future world poli-
tical and economic doubts. Are Japan's current military
expenditures anticipatory in nature and an indication
of another Korean or Vietnam conflict? What will the impli-
cations be for Japan during this current period of increased
arms production and procurement?
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III. INDEFINITE FUTURE: CONTINUED DEPENDENCE
"A community of the developed nations must even-
tually be formed if the world is to respond
effectively to the increasingly serious crisis
that in different ways now threatens both the
advanced world and the Third World."
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Between Two Ages
What Mr. Brzezinski refers to as a "serious crisis" is
the increasing division between the "haves" and the "have
nots" on a global stratum. This is a serious crisis and one
that effects Japan as well as other advanced nations in this
approaching post-industrial world.
Japan and these other technologically advanced societies
are confronted with a multitude of interrelated dilemmas -
control of technology, work roles, growth and distribution
of wealth. These dilemmas have interrelationships on two
levels - national and international. This interrelationship
or interdependency among societies and nations is a factor
influential in the present structure of the world order.
Therefore Japan's existence for an indefinite time will
depend on its western ally and the rate at which Japan
decides to move toward a greater independent role in the
world.
Many authors perceive a need for a structural altera-
tion of the present international economic order. These
writers advocate a new order that would redistribute the
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wealth between rich and poor countries and also between the
poor and privileged segments of the Third World. Many of
these "authorities" have limited perceptions - or perceptions
based on their positions - where you sit determines where
you stand - many even have tunnel vision when they discuss
the topic of world order. They limit their discussion and
perceptions to the rich and the poor, the developed and the
developing. Their all-encompassing locution, including
terms such as "Third World," is only appropriate as a
description of countries that have vast amounts of resource
wealth but lack development or industrialization. But
because of events that lead to the formation of OPEC and
similar regions there is a need to recognize a "Fourth World"
in the existing world order. This is a portion of the
world that is devoid of natural resources and with exiguous
prospects for increased future development, the resource
poor, but industrialized nations.
How does all this relate to Japanese rearmament and the
implications associated with this effort? Japan, although
not yet part of the "Fourth World" could, at some time in the
near future, be confronted with a number of the problems
associated with "Fourth World" nations today: problems
relating to resource transfers.
Japan's status - economically, politically and militarily
in the present structure of the world order is dependent
entirely on the cooperation and goodwill of other nations.
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Although this condition is often pointed out as being
unique to the Japanese, it is to some degree a condition
that all industrial nations must cope with. Even so, the
fact remains that Japan is almost totally dependent on
foreign sources for raw materials, natural resources and
its national security.
In this chapter the focus will be on the variables and
indicators associated with Japan's dependency role in the
present world order. Two general areas related to Japan's
perceived need to rearm will be discussed and analyzed:
resources - in relationship to Japan's needs, accessibility,
control and the security of these resources that are
necessary in order for Japan to maintain its present posi-
tion in the world order; and secondly, domestic rearmament
efforts to secure Japan's role as a dependent nation.
These factors control the implications for Japan's inde-
finite future.
A. RESOURCES
Resource scarcity is a "front page" topic in most
publication, public and private, today. With the extreme
emphasis placed on the subject and its strategic value to
national security interests, it would be difficult to
avoid its discussion in any analysis of a topic even
remotely related to economics and especially related to
Japan. Japan's scarcity of indigenous natural resources is
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well known throughout the industrial world. In any dis-
cussion o£ Japan's economy, it is a factor that is always
mentioned. The islands of Japan are deficient in almost
every raw material normally associated with the creation
and continued successful operation of an industrial
27
economy. With these facts in mind, how has Japami
managed its industrialization?
Since the time of the Meiji Restoration, Japan's goal
has been to "catch up with the West." Following World
War II, this goal was achieved by purchasing natural re-
sources on the world spot market, which helped maximize
the gross national product of Japan. But there have been
difficulties recently, both externally and internally,
associated with this approach. Externally, Japan has
become extremely dependent on other countries for resources
and is subject to external shocks like the oil crisis or
the soybean embargo. Japan is also confronted with other
difficult external factors or situations. The fact that
resources can be nationalized abroad almost overnight
is quite real and this is associated with another realism
of worldwide commodity shortages - physical or politically
motivated. Even Japan's grand strategy of resource diver-
sification cannot provide the necessary security as Japan
continues to increase its already large share of world
2 H
raw material imports. Internally, there are no good
33

reasons for the continued pursuit of this policy of the past
Japan has compromised much of its culture and sacrificed
quality of life in order to pursue the goals set by the
West. Economic growth has done much for Japan but the
price in national and individual identity has been high.
This Japanese approach to resource scarcity following
World War II - relying on the social institutions of inter-
national commerce and abandonment of pre-war goals of
military control to assure access to raw materials - was
accomplished through assurances made by the trading world
to supply Japan's commercial needs for raw materials.
The 1979 Defense White Paper implies that Japan's faith in
the continued success of this international policy has
deteriorated. This is reflected in the passage "...deep-
rooted confrontation and distrust continue among the nations
of the world, creating confrontations and disputes among
them. . .creating instability in international society. In
the niidst of such an international environment, the security
of nations must be maintained by comprehensive military
,
29
political, economic and diplomatic policies."
The options available in the expanse of resource
accessibility are not relished by Japan's political and
military leadership. When a resource-poor, developed
country confronts a world of politically motivated scarcity,
the reality of their situation becomes vivid. They could
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accept the situation and promote economic stagnation or even
economic decline. In this case, Japan would then require
fewer imports of raw materials and could concentrate on
reasserting its own true culture, which is different from
the West. If this option were rejected, then Japan must
face the reality of obtaining access to raw materials from
other countries by strengthening and exercising its geo-
political and military powers, an option similar to the one
followed in the 1930s.
With the uncertainty associated with the present inter-
national policies of resource accessibility and its global
implications, Japan will at some future date be coerced
into accepting either stagnated economic consequences or
geo-political, military expansionist policies. A stagnated
economy would not be a joyous option for Japan. It would
cause widespread societal strife within the nation. Exter-
nally the whole world would feel the effects of a no-growth
Japanese economy. This possibility is real to the Japanese,
and has caused long-run concern and pessimism within Japan.
In sum, today Japan is confronted with confinement to
a limited space, and a pressing population far greater than
the pre-war period. A substantial portion of its food and
raw materials must be imported and the possibility of inter-
diction either in transporting these essentials or in
accessibility to them is quite graphic. Japan's present
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approach to its natural resource deficiency may, in the
future, prove ineffectual in a world faced with severe
politically-motivated resource shortages. Japan's per-
ception of world resource scarcity will be a determinant
or an indicator of the degree to which policy changes will
occur, but the change will be toward some increased measure
of economic and military self-sufficiency. This degree
of change will be limited by and linked to Japan's military
and diplomatic strength and their position in the new world
order.
B. DOMESTIC REARMAMENT
It is clear that a no-growth Japanese economy is unaccept
able to both the Japanese and their trading partners - the
remainder of the world. Therefore, some consideration
should be accorded to the possibility of an effort by Japan
to enhance its present self-defense forces , thus providing
itself with a stronger geo-political capability of securing
its future and contributing to continued economic growth.
A reference of 1978 is a significant starting point
because one could ascertain a new, bolder direction in
Japan's foreign policy. 1978 was the year that Japan
signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the People's
Republic of China and the year that the Japanese first
publicly acknowledged the Soviet Union as a threat to Asia
in their 1978 Defense White Paper. 1978 was also the year
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that the Foreign Minister of Japan stated in an interview
that "... I shall never tire of my search for peace,
nor give up my feeling that war must be prevented at
all cost, by whatever means."
This statement by Sunao Sonoda would have been politi-
cally acceptable twelve months earlier, but in 1978 with
a decline in the left wing of the Liberal Democratic Party
and a regression of the pacifist movement nationally it
was political hara-kiri. It was just at this time in Japan
that political and public attitude changes toward defense
and increasing the national military capability took place.
It was this modification in attitude and the broadened
base of support for both the Self-Defense Force and the
U. S. forces in Japan that lead to the conclusion of a
government-to-government agreement between the United States
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and Japan for joint arms develpment and transfer. ^
This agreement has two extremely important implications
for Japan. First, it breaks the governmental export
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barrier that once surrounded Japanese defense industries.
Even though the transfers to the United States will be
Japanese electronic technology to U. S. firms, the fact
still remains that it is in direct conflict to a govern-
mental policy which bans the exportation of military
hardware or software. It is apparent that the Defense
Industry Committee of the Federation of Economic Organizations
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of Japan has persuaded the Japanese government that their
policy must be overlooked if Japan is going to pursue a
course of defense modernization. At the present time this
cooperation between the two countries will be related
to such weapons as cruise missiles and precision-guided
missiles. But in the future this agreement, which has
set a precedent, will be the guide for increased military
cooperation throughout Asia. Japan could attain the role
of a regional arms exporter that would rival that of France,
while simultaneously reducing the indigenous cost associated
with rearming so that the analogy - Switzerland of Asia -
33-
would be more accurate than ever.
Precision-guided munitions/missiles (PGMs) add a very
interesting aspect or implication to this agreement between
Japan and the United States. When advanced weaponry is the
topic there are numerous questions that arise concerning
ability of the nation in question to absorb the weapons,
added stability or instability the weapons bring to the
region of introduction and a question of defensive or
offensive nature of the PGMs. These questions are serious
and will be briefly addressed here.
An industrial advanced nation (Japan) will consider the
purchase of PGMs for various reasons: a perceived threat of
external forces, the relationship between cost and ability
to pay, and the ability of a skilled military force to
absorb the sophisticated PGMs.
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These conclusions can be made. There is a relationship
between stability and PGMs . They (PGMs) accelerate rather
than change the basic trends in conventional warfare. These
new, sophisticated PGMs will consume manpower and hardware
at a rate relative to their sophistication. This will mean
that if a country possesses these weapons and understands
the tactical nature of the weapon (which his adversary
may also possess) it will be necessary to have a large force
or one that is mobilized easily prior to and during any
conflict engagement. Engaging in a conflict that consumes
men and material at a rapid rate will require a support
system of equal sophistication. Therefore, the country
in question must have highly skilled manpower, not only
to operate the equipment, but also to maintain it and
have an understanding of the logistics necessary in the
event a conflict occurs. This is an accurate description of
the Japanese infrastructure.
There are some false assumptions associated with PGMs.
One that is important here is: they reduce the cost of
conflict engagement because they operate on a "one shot, one
kill" theory. As the system was described above, it is
evident that all this could actually increase the total
cost of force maintenance rather than reduce it, dependent
on the force structure and size.
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Another false assumption is that PGMs are basically a
defensive weapon and a stabilizing force. It could be
said that the best defense is a good offense, but this type
of weapon can be used in more than one role (like most
weapons invented by man) and threaten rear areas. This
threat when perceived by the adversary will increase the
risk of pre-emptive attack. But before the aggressor
decides to attack he must be willing to pay the conse-
quences, for a conflict involving PGMs (conventional) will
be extremely expensive in terms of equipment and men.
Therefore, these weapons could reduce the small-scale
"brushfire" type of aggression - if both sides were armed
with these weapons. The point here is that since these
weapons are relatively inexpensive to purchase (produce)
and they improve one's defensive (offensive) capabilities
greatly, they could be a deterrence to some nation's
historically aggressive hegemonic nature in a specific
region. It is believed that Japan is possibly pursuing
this capability of increased effectiveness offered by PGMs
to reduce the need for nuclear proliferation in Asia.
This theory has prevailed in Japan for thirty years (by
no means a conclusive timeframe in a historical sense) . It
is still difficult to determine if PGMs will be/are stabilizing
or not. The consequence for stability will be linked to
the total levels and distribution of weapons in a region
... . 34
and not to the acquisition of PGMs.
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The cost of rearming is the factor that has slowed the
cautious progress of the Japanese government. It is also
the barrier that is now eroding. Prime Minister Ohira has
stated that there is a need for increased defense spending,
but that because of political (and economic) realities a
large-scale build-up would be difficult to achieve.
This has not diminished a sense of anticipation among
the business leaders of Japan's defense-related industries. ^
They sense an opportunity for large profits because defense
spending is not subject to the same economic cycles that
affect the other sectors of Japan's declining economy.
Vtfith high profit margins offered by any defense related
industry and the relatively few firms associated with
this industry, there are enormous profits to be made by
these firms in a time when the world is experiencing
international instability, resource scarcity and declining
economic growth.
C. THE FRENCH CONNECTION
With these three factors (international instability,
resource scarcity, and declining economic growth) in mind,
it is relatively simple to construct a model of Japan as a
regional arms exporter. Variables affecting this model are
continued growth, technological development, balance of
payments for equilibrium, access to raw materials, and the
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desire for high employment. The model is based on the
French arms industry and its governmental support, as is
evident in a brief reference to pertinent factors that
follow.
Since the end of World War II, the French government
has desired to achieve the aformentioned variables. Their
industrial expansion was fueled by under-utilized agricul-
tural labor. In the 1960s France had the highest growth
rate in Western Europe. In 1973 the Arab oil embargo was
a hindrance to France's economic momentum. At this point
in history, arms sales (foreign military sales - FMS) and
the associated industry assumed a position of importance
in France. France's weak competitive position, worsening
trade posture, lower economic growth, inflation and high
unemployment, and an energy deficit of 60 billion francs
(1976) all contributed to the importance placed on arms
sales as a high foreign exchange earner.
In order to halt this declining economy and internal
instability, the French government took steps to re-
structure French foreign commerce in the areas of capital
goods and in securing new trade partners in the Third
World. These areas are where arms sales have played impor^
tant roles. Application of this policy achieved good
results between 1974 and 1976. The "real value" to French
productivity (business affairs and exports) has grown.
France's balance of payments and commercial position now
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depend on arms sales. The initial, justification for this
dependent nature was: with increased arms research and
development and "tooling up" costs are reduced by the larger
volume of production. Also FMS were used to support tech-
nology advancements and support independent military and
diplomatic policies. This independent and autonomous
weapons production capacity achieved the leverage France
desired in bargaining with the superpowers. It was also
a commitment to self-determination, a linkage between the
welfare and security functions of government and a mechanism
of modernization.*^
This model is highly realistic if one considers the
role Japan perceives for itself in the next two to three
decades. The Japanese appreciate the fact that in the
present world order there is no single overwhelming power
capable of dominating global events and reorganizing the
world order as the United States did at the end of World
War II. Therefore, the approach they perceive as being
operationalized by any dominant powers is one of regionalism,
Therefore it is inconceivable to the Japanese that ASEAN
and China could develop without cooperative relations with
Japan. The Japanese, through their economic-industrial




The next step for Japan in this role as a larger regional
military force is to provide for the security of its charges.
Through an arms sales program, Japan could not only contri-
bute to its increasing independent military defense effort,
but an arms sales program to ASEAN and China would serve
as a tool in the Japanese regional strategy of governmental
centrism for Third World nations of Asia. This would not
only reduce the dependency of these nations on the super-
powers but would also contribute to the greater implemen-
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tation of Japan's multi-directional diplomacy.
One of the flaws a critic of this model may point out
it that the arms market is already dominated by highly
industrialized nations that have a large share of the
market. Since competition in foreign markets has not been
a factor to the Japanese in the past and with their technical
expertise and established reputation for high quality
equipment, such as automobiles and electronics, a foothold
has already been established and military sales could be
integrated easily. The benefits for Japan are obvious:
arms exports would assure full employment and the profit-
ability of numerous undertakings and permit them to lengthen
the production series and thereby lower the unit cost of
arms manufactured, facilitating the equipment of their
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own armed forces at lesser expense. The economy of
Japan's defense industry today - an industry and weapons
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modernization program that is impeded by governmental
policy requiring indigenous production of 801 of all
military hardware - would have greater allowances for
capacity expansion, providing an expanded production base
that would be tailored to coping with crisis and increased
threat perception. The small production base now could
be expanded easily by increasing the military weapons
and technology trade between China, ASEAN and Japan.
Another factor closely related to Japanese economics
and security is the search for energy and the necessity
for strategic resources. Since the Japanese are for the
first time in their recent history experiencing a trade
deficit with the oil-rich O.P.E.C. nations, a model for
their "new" trading relations would be simple to construct.
The Japanese could justify an arms sales agreement with
either China or the oil-rich O.P.E.C. countries a number
of different ways. It has been stated that there is a
need to achieve balance in the Japanese-O.P.E.C. trade .
relationship. For the quantities of oil that Japan
desires, it could offer reliable military equipment
sophisticated enought to attract the Arab world, yet simple
enough that it would not require extended or intensive
training by the Japanese to operate. This sector of the arms
market is relatively untouched and would be a novelty.
The major arms producers in the world, the U. S., U.S.S.R.,
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Great Britain and France, are quite apt at supplying highly-
sophisticated military hardware, but this requires inten-
sive in-country training by advisors to become operational.
The Japanese, in supplying equipment that just meets and
does not exceed the needs of the recipient nation, would
be gaining the raw resources they need in exchange for
a relatively small quantity of arms that are a highly
valuable commodity.
In Asia, Japan's argument for supplying arms would be
similar, but would have more altruistic connotations. The
Japanese have realized for decades the possibilities and
benefits of economic cooperation in Asia. The record of
the developing countries in Asia is extraordinary. Even
after the oil embargo of 1973, most have been able to
maintain annual growth rates between 5 and 8 percent a
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year, in spite of a growing global recession. They
(the Japanese) also have a need for more export fields
now that they are encountering increased barriers in the
United States and Europe. Therefore, a Japan professing an
"Asia for Asians" and offering economical and military
assistance could sell this argument as providing the
Third World nations of Asia with the means of protecting
their abundance of natural resources and their independence
from the dominating superpowers.
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In sum, the Japanese industrial machine, Japan Inc., is
facing fierce competition in the traditional fields of manu-
factured goods from some Asian competitors and is hindered
by nationalistic barriers rising in the West and Europe.
These factors are aggravated by rising inflation, low
economic growth and increasing social pressures at home.
There are new demands being heard that call for a new era
in which Japan must secure and invest in markets abroad
while developing its own technologies instead of copying
the West's.
Japan, while showing impressive technological innovation
and a high degree of automation in present industries, has
also created unemployment and discontent within the existing
system. Productivity in many of the highly automated
industries has fallen far below capacity. Yet wage demands
peak at about 9% per year while economic growth stagnates
near 4%. Consumer prices increase annually at 81 and the
driving force behind it all is a wholesale price rise of
211. All these factors are accentuated by the closure of
5.4 million small businesses, a major portion ofthe Japanese
industrial network.
Currently Japan confronts a variety of domestic and
international uncertainties. It is not known how long
Japan will be able to continue its policy of decoupling
economic policies and relationships from political and
47

military ones. Does the 1980 defense budget reflect a
coupling of policies in Japan? Will a growing defense
industry be a panacea or a provocation for Japan's
economic woes?
D. JAPAN'S DEFENSE BUDGET
In the past seven years Japanese defense expenditures,
while remaining at a relatively stable 0.90 percent of
Japan's gross national product, have increased from $3.9
billion in 1974 to $9.7 billion in 1980."^^ While the
purpose of this analysis is not to examine the Japanese
defense budget, it will provide some insight into Japanese
efforts to augment its defense structure.
The 1980 Japanese defense budget, like all previous
defense budgets, does not include military pensions and
certain other costs associated with a typical Western
defense budget. If these associated costs were included
in Japan's military budget, the figure would be near 1.5^
of their gross national product.
Nearly 501 of the current Japanese military budget is
allocated for personnel cost. This allocation is for a
force of only about 240,000 men. This computes to be over
$19,000 per man to maintain a force that because of its
size reflects Japan's emphasis on a quality force.
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The remainder of the budget is divided into procurement
and operations of the SDF and research and development cost.
Among the three branches of the SDF, the ground force
receives the largest portion, while the navy and air force
are evenly split. What is significant about the Japanese
military budget is not what is included, but what is
excluded from it.
One of the exclusions is Japan's national space develop-
ment program. Much of the research and expense of this
program is absorbed by Tokyo University's Institute of
Space and Aeronautical Sciences. Their most recent project
has been the testing of a launch vehicle with a three-stage
solid-fuel motor system. This system is officially being
tested for scientific observations at altitudes between
134-217 miles. This launch vehicle can carry a payload of
over 400 pounds and would appear to have military role
capabilities. These Japanese space development and launch
vehicle programs amount to about $1 billion per year and the
1 A
current programs are forecasted to last 15 years. These
programs could provide Japan with an ABM (anti-ballistic
missile) capability prior to 1990.
Another factor associated with this unique budgetary
system the Japanese have is the field of nuclear research.
Currently the Japanese are developing nuclear technology
in all the major processes inherent to the production of
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nuclear fuel-mining and milling, refining, enrichment,
fabrication, power reactor use and construction, reprocessing
and disposal. The costs associated with this research and
development and technology have all been absorbed by-
civilian programs.
What is even more interesting is the fact that Japan
has almost no indigenous sources of uranium. But the
Japanese continue to develop their nuclear programs. This
action has required Japan to actively engage in a program
of developing uranium resources overseas. Since the mid-
1960s Japan has conducted resource development in South
Australia, Somalia, Thailand, Malaysia and various countries
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in Central and South America. ' It is doubtful that Japan
will allow itself to be held hostage by the uranium rich
countries if a major portion of Japan's power needs are
supplied by the increasing number of electricity generating
plants powered by nuclear reactors.
E. SUMMATION
This chapter may have raised more questions concerning
Japanese efforts to secure strategic resources and its
domestic rearmament efforts than it answered. But this
does not minimize its importance since these questions are
associated with the analysis of Japan's current trends and
actions regarding resources and security.
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It can be concluded that Japan is emphasizing a military
capability significantly greater than just a few years ago.
Whether this new security stance is more the result of a
Soviet Pacific forces build-up, decreased American world
status, or a Japanese fear of economic collapse is not clear.
History may prove that each of these factors with their
associated linkages is part of a force behind Japan's
efforts toward independence and rearmament.
As salient as these factors may appear, they are not
cause enough for Japan to pursue a totally independent
course, politically or militarily, disassociated from the
United States. There will be no radical departure from
its present security dependence on the United States, nor
will Japan divorce itself from the enormously valuable
markets and resources provided by the interdependence it
enjoys with the Western world.
There will be increased political, economic and military
association and interaction with the nations of Asia. This
region has the capability of becoming the world's most
dynamic, economically, in the future. There will be dramatic
changes in relationships within the region. Both ASEAN
and Japan realize the inter-dependence and reliance they
share. They also seek a cooperative effort in the new
Asian market of China. There is ample opportunity for
foreign investment in this region and the only thing that
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will upset it is political instability. But the importance
of Japan's role in Asia only serves to underscore the
importance Japan places on its relationship with the U. S.
It is unlikely that Japan will continue to be as sub-
ordinate a partner as it currently appears to be in the
Pacific security sphere of the United States. Any and all
moves by Japan toward indigenous security (resource or
military) will tend to reduce the degree of domination by
its Western ally. If Japan desires this increased autonomy
and in the process is willing to forego the expense, both
political and economic, in order to achieve this degree
of autonomy, then a strategic question which still remains
unanswered for Japan and the world is: will Japan be able
to achieve the degree of autonomy it desires without




IV. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF AUTONOMY
"If all else fails, military power will prevail"
Japan is the only nation in the Asian region, ignoring
the potential of China, that through its indigenous pro-
duction is capable of developing an armed force exceeding
its current level. Japan, being a modern industrial nation
and security-conscious, produces approximately 98% of its
munitions and 85% of the materiel needs of the SDF. Japan's
population of over 112 million provides the potential for
a mass citizenry force. Moreover, its nuclear technology
and delivery system expertise enables Japan to step into
the nuclear weapons arena almost immediately, if they
haven't already done so.
There are geopolitical and economic interests of three
great powers in this region, interests that focus on Japan
and rival each other for a position of predominance.
Japan's role has been and will continue to be a pivotal role
in the triangular relationships in this region. This
delicate role that Japan plays between China, Russia and
the United States could be altered by any change in Japan's
defense posture. Japan's analogous role as the Switzerland
of Asia appears to be soon a self-fulfilling prophecy and
the political leadership of Japan appears to be making
48gestures that may upset this delicate balance. It is
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now up to each actor in this precision mutuality, known as
world order, to define the options available to it and
take appropriate and immediate action to assure peace and
prosperity throughout the region in light of recent
military and diplomatic developments.
This chapter will highlight a variety of the options
and appropriate actions available to these international
actors if Japan's gestures are indeed moves toward a more
autonomous defense and foreign policy program. In other
words, what are the strategic implications for China,
Russia and the United States in relation to a rearmed
Japan? But prior to attempting to address this question,
it would be beneficial to address the question of each
nation's own national interests in this region and the
concept of national interest as it relates to this work.
A. THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL INTEREST
The nation-state, although diverse in nature, tries to
provide the other world actors with a single image of its
national interests, even though these interests are kaleido-
scopic. This should not come as a surprise to either the
adversaries or the allies of the nation-state since their




The concept of national interest is of central impor-
tance to sovereign states. It is through this key concept
that the national actors relate to the world actors the
objectives of the nation-state in the international
organization.
The nation-state is a complex set of bureaucratic insti-
tutions and roles where the term "national interest" has
context. Americans tend to think of their national
government as a large blundering bureaucratic mass incapable
of sustained action unless it is faced with an internal
and/or external crisis. In the non-^crisis environment,
decision-making seems to be derived by conflicting interest
within the bureaucracy extending from the society through
the ostensibly hierarchically ordered central bureaucracy
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of the state.
Societal pressures determine the behavior of the state's
government through the political process of their respective
systems, but the national interests of that state (pre-
eminently the United States) are dictated to the international
actors by the political head of state and his foreign
affairs/national security advisors.
This can be illustrated by briefly reviewing the major
political events affecting the Pacific Basin in the past
decade, listed at the beginning of Chapter II. These poli-
tical events, some influenced by the United States and others
totally void of U. S. involvement, have reshaped the domestic
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attitudes of the nations involved and have emotionally
damaged the United States' political leadership. But in a
basically bipolar world, the influence a major actor has
could be deficient although involvement should never be
a deficiency in the arena where major political events
reshape world order. The American public echoes "no more
Vietnam" and their leaders conclude that America can no
longer be the "world's policeman." This is closely followed
by an essentially reactive, noninvolveraent outlook on world
affairs. The emotional wounds that have been inflicted
on the American leaders will heal, albeit the scars may
remain for an indefinite period.
In the Pacific Basin these scars have become visible to
the political leaders of Japan, despite the present admini-
stration's continued reassurances to the contrary. There
remains a margin of doubt in the Asian minds as to America's
resolve to act in accordance with their perception of United
States treaty commitments. Not only do Asians sense a
"failure of will" on America's part, but other allies also
express similar doubts. These doubts are underscored by
the fact that the Soviet Union is now involved in the
greatest military buildup in all history; that they now have
transformed a once-defensive coastal naval force into a
power-projecting blue water navy capable of extending power
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anywhere in the world; and that through their military
buildup they are achieving the major political and diplo-
matic goals of the Soviet Union.
Japan's political leaders also sense a U. S. preoccupa-
tion with domestic problems which have linkages to the
Middle East and Europe. At the same time, Japanese leaders
express interest and desire for continued American presence
in their region. It therefore becomes essential to America
and its allies in the Pacific Basin that they define their
regional national interest in terms that clarify the com-
plexity and kaleidoscopic nature of American foreign policy
B. PACIFIC BASIN INTEREST
Japanese societal pressures determine the behavior of
the national government. The foreign policy of the state
is only one interest among many and the Japanese reject
the notion of a national interest that is not a product
of the combined efforts of pluralistic societal goals. It
is their contention that the concept of national interest
has no meaning except as a summation of pluralistic pre-
ferences.
The two major actors that are adjacent to Japan in
Asia (PRC and USSR) may have another concept of national
interest that is also valid. Their national interests can
be summated by a consistent set of objectives sought by
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central actors of government at the decision-making level.
These objectives could be the acquisition of influence and
use of power on an international and regional level.
Soviet interests in Asia have been expressed openly
since about 1963 when the ideological split with China
manifested and the Soviets began to increase their affir-
mation as an Asian power. Soviet interest in Asia, in
relationship to Japan, since that time has also been well
defined.
A Soviet presence in Asia prior to April 30, 1975 could
be summarized as cautious probing with the Soviet bayonet.
Their interests were directly linked to their defensive
posture on the Sino-Soviet border and amassing military
defensive forces in the Asian region that connoted Moscow's
approach to foreign policy - if all else fails , military
power will prevail . During this period the Soviet bayonet
would meet resistance and withdraw at irregular intervals.
Today the Soviets' steely bayonet is finely honed and meets
little if any resistance in this region. Their interests
are now related to the massing of military forces but not
only to ensure their hard-nose, uncompromising stands, but
also to bring pressure on the regional actors to acquiesce
to Soviet strategic views of world order, a view that
employs military power to guarantee its security and position
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The Soviets have three goals that are reflected by their
actions in the Pacific Basin. First, they have strategic
goals. Faced with an American- Japanese military alliance
that is posed at their eastern front, they attempt to loosen
the bonds between the signators of this alliance. Attempts
to affect this alliance must also be accompanied by an
attempt to discourage Tokyo from major rearmament, while
simultaneously preventing Sino- Japanese rapprochement.
The second goal is economic. Japan is totally depen-
dent upon external sources of raw materials and energy.
The Soviets, noting this dependency and the vast industrial
and technological base Japan would provide for an undeve-
loped Siberia, strive for a Japan that is economically, as
well as politically, linked to Russia.
The third goal is political. While the parties of this
bipolar world compete for Japanese allegiance, the Japanese
are assessing the options: go nuclear or vastly increase her
conventional forces. Japan is likely to act as a free agent
for an indefinite period until its vital national interests
are threatened to such a degree that Japan is left with no
choice but to defend itself with all available means and
alliance commitments.
There are serious obstacles that impede any major
improvements in Soviet- Japanese relations. The Soviet
"heavy hand" nature in diplomacy and law of the sea issues
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in dispute have not helped their image in Japan. The Soviet
Union consistently scores lowest in public opinion polls
in Japan, reflecting Japanese perceptions of Russian inten-
tions in the Pacific Basin.
Today Chinese interests outside of the Pacific Basin
are of little concern to the other global actors, save their
potential as an economic and military force to be contended
with at some distant future date. Albeit China possesses
a nuclear capability and could be envisioned as one of the
five major world actors, it does not have the ability to
project its influence beyond the boundaries of Asia. This
perception of weakness is recognized by the other major
powers and is capitalized on by the Soviet Union.
Soviet rhetoric from the Kremlin repeatedly stresses
the present Chinese inferior military and economic capabi-
lities in relation to the U.S.S.R. China's recent programs
to counter this perception of impotency has led to serious
questions being raised within the party apparatus as to the
pervesity of its ideological commitment. This fact was
underscored by the purge of six Politburo members lead by
Wang Dong-xing, who opposed Deng Xiao-ping's efforts of
reform, and the re-emergence/promotion of Chen Yun, the
leader of China's post-1949 economic recovery. ^^ These
actions were followed by a reassessment of the proposed




The leadership of China desires to present a unified
front against its primary security threat and major compe-
titor for influence in this region. Therefore, the Chinese
will continue to try to align themselves with any anti-Soviet
scheme, especially those sustained by nations that China
could elicit economic and military assistance from. At the
present time this tactic is accented by a large portion of
Chinese foreign policy rhetoric.
Chinese perceptions of Soviet intentions in the Pacific
Basin contributed to the confrontation between the regime of
Vietnam and the Peoples Liberation Army. By sustaining
Vietnam, Chinese leaders appraised that Moscow had rearranged
the Pacific Basin power structure. This realpolitik was
unacceptable to Chinese leaders on two counts: China could
not accept Vietnam's "brazen interference" in Cambodia and
they could not accept without challenge the continuation of
a well-equipped power basking in the alliance of Moscow and
eliminating China's geographical advantage of contending
with the presence of Russia on only one border.
The mutuality of interests between China and Japan
have been enhanced, on all levels, by the dynamics of
world affairs and Soviet intervention in Asia. Although
the ideologies of these two actors differ, their cultural
bonds are firm. This factor is sustained by a Japanese
approach to business that separates it from the political





Interest in Western (read Japanese) technology for the
progress of China's modernization program is of great
importance to Chinese leadership. Japan's role in this
development seems to be critically important, since the
United States' approach to providing China with technology
is likely to be similar to its past approach when dealing
with other developing countries - piece-meal in nature and
often inappropriate for the cultural context of the
country.
An exchange of Chinese raw materials for Japanese tech-
nology will likely be the terms of trade and will benefit
both countries. Another benefit that can be realized by
both countries is an alliance that will provide China with
the modern military materiel it requires and in turn
providing Japan with an opportunity for a more creditable
nuclear deterrence that has proven its will to act within
the region.
The Confucian culture that embraces both China and
Japan is embroiled with a myriad of devices to "save face"
whenever possible. They believe that if one is perceived
as weak, then he is weak, and it is only a matter of time
before the United States will be perceived as weak if it




When the concept of national interest is put in the
context of American policy in the Pacific Basin, a clear
ranking of goals is suggested:
1) preserve sufficient economic, political and military
strength to guarantee the security of American vital
interests in the region;
2) maintain its strategic presence in Asia;
3) maintain its alliance with Japan;
4) preserve and extend our economic relations;
5) solve problems of economic and political compe-
tition to the mutual benefit of all.
These goals reflect the national interest of the United
States in Japan and the Pacific Basin in general. By no
means do these goals indicate policy coherency or reflect
the implementation of policy associated with these interests.
Looking at what the central decision-makers in America do,
as opposed to what the American people and government would
ideally prefer, presents at times a contrary and kalei-
doscopic picture.
Of these five interests outlined above, the United States
is confronted with competition from the Soviet Union in all
the areas. As Russia expands its military and political
influence in the Pacific Basin, the United States will face
the possibility of having to broaden its multilateral
relationships with the actors of the region in order to
accommodate and protect the mutual interest of all nations
in the Asian-Pacific region.
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When and if the balance in the Pacific Basin moves more
heavily in favor of the Soviets and if the United States
continues to fail at adequately readdressing the situation,
it will require Japan to either reassess its position in
relation to the trilateral powers, or to make a inuch
greater autonomous defense effort. The choice will not
be free or easy.
It would be in America's national interest to begin
to develop a stronger West European-American-Japanese-
South Korean cooperative effort. The Chinese would only
be offered a position in this association after the People's
Republic of China has taken appropriate steps to modernize
its military and political structure and indicated its
willingness to cooperate with the association. This
association between Asia and Europe would present the
Soviet Union with a potential economic and military giant
on two fronts. This would require a more capable Japanese
defense force in the near future and the possible nuclear
rearmament of Japan at some later date. With a favorable
United States foreign policy reflecting American national
interests, Japan's position vis a vis the adjacent Pacific
Basin powers will remain favorable toward this western
cooperative association.
Associated with U. S. interest in this region are
economic linkages between Japan, the United States and
ASEAN. These linkages are associated with Japanese and
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American dependence on sea transportation for the movement
of commercial products and national security forces that
protect the rights of free transit through international
straits. It is important, if not vital, that both Japan
and the United States have access to the various straits
adjacent to ASEAN nations. Two straits, the Strait of
Malacca and the Strait of Lombok, are of strategic impor-
tance for the movement of U. S. naval forces from the
Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean region.
It is true that these straits are strategically valuable
to U. S. naval forces, but these straits are equally vital
to Japan's economy. The interdiction of Japanese shipping
in this region would have an eminently disastrous effect
on Japan's economy and would to some degree affect the
economy of North America - Japan being the second largest
trading partner of the U. S. The critical nature of this
situation has been expressed by conjectures that from
75 to 85 percent of Japan's vital petroleum needs must
transit through these choke points. Japanese tankers,
spaced twenty to fifty miles apart, are said to stretch
in an unbroken chain from Japanese territorial waters
to the Persian Gulf. Japanese tankers also depart
Indonesian ports about every five hours, twenty-four hours
a day, en route to Japan with other vital, economy-sustaining
cargo. A large portion of Japanese exports, approximately
30%, also must transit through the Malaccan or Lombok Straits.
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It is evident that the Japanese have direct interests
associated with the waters adjacent to many o£ the ASEAN
nations and that they are achieving a degree of security in
the region through economic aid and cooperation with ASEAN.
Japan, because of its proximity to ASEAN and its reliance
on the raw materials available from the region, has made a
greater effort to enhance its relations with these nations
than has its Western ally.
Today, Japan and the United States together account for
a major portion of the foreign trade of the ASEAN group.
But it was the Arab oil embargo of 1973, threatening a
fragile economy and emphasizing Japan's resource vulner-
ability, that lead to Japan's renewed interest in these
nations of Southeast Asia.
Japan's interest and penetration of the ASEAN economies
has its foundations in the East Asian Co - Prosperity Sphere.
Today, Japan continues to increase its share of the market
through Japanese business and private foreign investments
in the region. Japan is Singapore's largest trading partner
and in the past has pledged financial aid to all of the
ASEAN states for regional industrial projects and the
Cambodian and Vietnamese refugee aid programs.
It is likely that these ASEAN nations will require
large amounts of foreign economic assistance for future
development and that a larger portion of this aid will be
supplied by Japan. The aid provided by both Japan and the
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United States will be welcomed, but the ASEAN leaders are
concerned about the deliberate Soviet/Vietnamese efforts
to destabilize Southeast Asia and the appearance of
ineffectiveness associated with the United States at
this time.
C. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
In any analysis of the strategic implications of a
Japan seeking greater military and political autonomy, in
relation to the major Pacific Basin powers, one would have
to include the "official" rhetoric articulated by these
actors. But in Asia, historically one of the most turbulent
and rapidly changing areas of the world, there are inherent
dangers associated with this analysis of rhetoric in rela-
tionship to the realpolitik of relations between the super-
powers.
There is a growing perception among international
political scientists that the gap between reality and
rhetoric is ever-widening. Therefore, it becomes ques-
tionable as to the validity one can place on foreign
policy statements made by political heads of state and their
appointed spokespersons.
This gap is highly discernible in American foreign
policy, especially in relation to Japan. Since about 1975,
when then Secretary of Defense Schlesinger visited Tokyo,
the American policy has been to publicly criticize Japan
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for its passive role in support of American interests in
the Pacific Basin. These same sentiments were more recently
re-emphasized by the present Defense Secretary Harold
Brown, who urged increased defense spending on Japan's part
by stating that "coping with expanded Soviet military
power was a matter of national security," and that Japan's
defense spending should be fixed with that point in mind,
not an arbitrary percentage of GNP. Yet on the other hand,
the impression is widely held in Japan that the United
States government denies Japan technology in weapons systems
that would aid in the standardization between U. S. and
Japanese forces.
At the present time Japan only receives technology for
weapons development through license for production. This
does not introduce new technology into industry, since much
of the high technology work is accomplished in the United
States and then sent to Japan for assembly. This factor
alone is enough to create a worldwide perception of a Japan,
now spending more on research and development of weapons
than ever before, in the process of assuming a larger role,
politically and militarily, in the Pacific and forcing
Japan into arms exporting in Asia because of limited pro-'i
duction runs of weapons and economy of scale.
This is only one example of the growing gap between the
rhetoric and the reality in U. S. -Japan relations and by no
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means is it intended to imply that the United States is the
only government guilty o£ increasing the gap.
The Soviet Union's diplomatic approach to foreign
policy during the past decade has clearly been a failure,
while their military approach to foreign policy has been
more productive but diplomatically counter-productive.
Their approach - if all else fails, military (power,
actions, threats) will prevail - has helped produce a new
strategic triangle in Asia that will grow more dynamic and
become more vital as the decade progresses. The members
of this "new" triangle are China, Japan and the United
States
.
A gradual military buildup, over the past decade, of
Soviet forces in and around Asia raises many questions con-
cerning their intentions. Some speculation is that this
is part of an effort to isolate China in Northeast Asia
or to realize the Brezhnev concept of "a system of collective
S3ecurity in Asia."
In the first conjecture Soviet moves have produced
closer cooperation between the "new strategic triangle"
at Soviet expense. Their actions and statements have
strengthened the hand of the Japanese defense agency and
its supporters abroad and in the foreign ministry. One
such conservative party leader in Japan is former Defense
Agency Director General Nakasone. He has recently and
publicly discussed plans to increase defense spending past
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the II mark in an effort to increase the existing stockpile
of munitions, oil and food to six months. It is also
expected that a recent purchase of American planes to replace
current jet fighters and patrol aircraft will exceed the
1% limit. The total purchase price was 4.5 billion dollars,
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spread over a decade. When this II of the gross national
product barrier is exceeded on a regular basis, it will
no longer be important as an accurate indicator of Japanese
defense attitudes.
This new diplomatic/military alignment or a strengthening
of the existing one in Asia could create increased tension
between these regional actors. The signing, of the Sino-
Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty has already produced
a formal protest from Moscow and may have played a signifi-
cant role in the formation of a treaty between the Soviet
Union and Vietnam. The Soviets have a great fear of a U. S.-
China-Japan-South Korea military "axis" directed against
them. This fear of the Russians is not totally unfounded,
since Japanese have close economic ties with both Koreas
and have a close association with the Chinese culturally,
and an alliance with the United States. The Japanese
also express a degree of guilt for the 1930s and World
War II, and in an effort to alleviate some of the guilt
they have decided to invest in Chinese economic development
rather than investing in Siberia.
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The Chinese, on the other hand, have made a startling
attitude transformation over the past decade toward Japan's
approach to rearmament. China's political-military environ-
ment has shown growing support for an enlarged Japanese
defense base and effort. This change in attitude, on
China's part, is related to Peking's desire to acquire
Japanese weapons and defense-related technology.
The other inference stated refers to Soviet action and
rhetoric toward a collective security system. Soviet
buildup in Asia can also be largely attributed to their
perception of vulnerability in the Soviet Far East due to
the Sino-Soviet border conflicts of 1969. In an effort
to stabilize their position in East Asia the Soviets over
the past decade have introduced increasing quantities of
naval aviation forces to the region, while reinforcing
their divisions along the Sino-Soviet border. This force
intensification could also be due to a perception of
increased security on Russia's western front.
There may be a linkage between European security and
Asian insecurity for the Soviets. In recent years the
Soviet Union has signed nonaggression treaties, formalized
borders and acronyms such as SALT and MBFR have become the
language of negotiations in Europe. There is also an
increasing acceptance of the Warsaw Pact as a dependable
part of their defense in Europe.
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When Soviet action in Europe is contrasted to that of
Asia the picture becomes clear. Diplomatic rigidity has
been the case and not the exception in Asia. Territorial
disputes are not discussed and borders are frozen in respect
to China as well as Japan is the official Soviet position.
This position of rigidity led to a Japanese rejection of
the 1978 peace treaty with Moscow. Six months later the
Japanese signed a peace treaty with China that included
an anti-hegemony clause bluntly directed at the Soviet
Union.
The United States' reaction has been the acceptance of
an implied alliance that is indicative of the rhetoric-
reality gap. While it is unlikely that the United States
will overtly ally with China, the rhetoric from official
sources is quite vivid. One hears phrases similar to
"any nation which seeks to weaken or isolate you (China)
in world affairs assumes a stance counter to American
interest;" or statements made by American officials ex-
pressing that the U. S. is committed to "advance our
(U. S. -China) many parallel strategic and bilaterial
interest." Rhetoric - not backed by action - is extremely
dangerous. It is likely to heighten Moscow's perceptions
of insecurity in Asia, while promoting "worst case" Soviet
mili,tary planning which will aggravate Chinese and American
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perceptions of the Soviet threat. This could all lead
to greater disharmony in diplomatic communications and an
escalation of instability within the region.
There is another inference linked to Soviet expansion
into Asia that warrants examination. It is related to the
perception of Soviet foreign policy and the numerous factors
associated with it. It is also linked to the fact that the
Soviet Union has in recent years become a net importer of
material and grain, decreasing its once independent posi-
tion of self-sufficiency. This vulnerability is especially
critical as the Soviets increase their efforts to develop
the mineral and energy resource of Asia to supply the
European-Russian economy. This all leads to the strategic
importance the Soviets place on their Pacific forces and
their dependence on sea transportation for power projection
and commerical needs.
Soviet ocean policy in the Pacific Basin cannot be
divorced from the overall Soviet military and political
strategy. In the Pacific Basin the Soviet Union faces
increasing challenge because of the vulnerability of its
defensive posture in Asia. No other maritime power relies
so greatly on access through and to the water lying off the
shores of other states. Only northeastern Siberia lies
directly off an ocean. The U.S.S.R. in a world of 200-mile
territorial seas (vice economic zone) would have no
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southerly routes for exit from the Seia of Japan. Only-
Siberian routes would be fully under Soviet control. This
situation could limit the navigation of the Soviet Navy
and merchant marine. It would restrict Soviet fishing
and oceanographic activities. Albeit all western maritime
powers would also be significantly restricted by a 200-mile
territorial sea extension, none would be as constrained as
the U.S.S.R., making the Soviet position weaker vis a vis
western maritime strength.
There are 121 international straits which are wider
than six but less than 24 miles. These straits connect
major bodies of water. The Soviet strait position is very
similar to those of the western maritime powers and very
dissimilar from those of states such as Indonesia, which
seeks to extend its control over neighboring waterways.
The Soviet stand primarily benefits the Soviet Navy which
would retain favorable passage rights through the straits
of the Sea of Japan and the Indonesian Straits. Their
conviction is clear - coastal states should have no right
to suspend passage through international straits.
Related to Soviet current ocean policy is the current
fisheries dispute between the Soviet Union and Japan. This
is a mixture of oceanic, political and economic factors that
change frequently. There appear to be two major issues of




At the termination of hostilities in 1945, the Soviet
Union enjoyed a powerful international position in Asia
and was able to assert control over the disputed territory
and also demand regulation of fishing in the Northwestern
Pacific Ocean. Fishing in the Northwestern Pacific Ocean
for salmon, herring, crab, and Othfer marine resources
also reflects political and economic interaction and is
regulated by a joint Soviet-Japanese commission created in
1956. Until the end of World War II the Japanese enjoyed
a relative position of dominance that was achieved through
treaty rights granted by the Russians after their defeat
in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. However, after World
War II, Soviet fishing industry development and increased
political strength reaffirmed a stronger Soviet position
in subsequent negotiations. In fact, the Soviets have
been "heavy handed" in their approach to the fishing dispute
since 1958, closing many areas to Japanese fishing and
placing heavy restriction on salmon and crab catches.
Russia's 200-mile economic zone and limits placed on
Japan's catches have devastated the fishing industries of
Japan and Korea. This Japanese industry, which is ranked
number one in terms of catch per ton of equipment, and
contributes over $7 billion yearly to the Japanese economy,
has some 5,500 fishing and processing boats idle. Canneries




Today, however, the Soviet position has been shifted
by a Japan that is a major economic power with industrial
and technological capabilities that are needed by the
Soviet Union. This new position enhances Japanese leverage
when dealing with the Soviets.
The linkages between the issue of safe fishing and the
dispute over the "northern territories" has wide dimensions
and also encompasses political, economic and security
issues. It involves domestic politics as well as foreign
diplomatic policy. The Soviets maintain that the problem
is an American creation, in a cold war atmosphere, and that
this issue was settled permanently by the World War II
peace treaty.
The conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet
Union and Japan depends on mutual resolution of the
"northern territories" issue, which also affects the bilateral
fishing relations of the adversaries. The disagreement
concerns the sovereignty of four islands in the Kurile
chain: the Habomai Group and Shikotan, Kunashiri and
Etorofu. Varying interpretations of the secret Yalta
agreement, the Cairo and Potsdam declarations, and the
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 are the bases for the
dispute.
The Soviet position reflects a concern for the possible
effects a territorial concession would have on the long-
standing Sino-Soviet border dispute and a Soviet security
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system based on buffer states protecting vital areas. In
rebuttal, the Japanese position contends that historical
sovereignty over the islands and subjective interpretation
of the international agreements justify this claim. Since
the early 1960s the Russians have required a complete
withdrawal of U. S. forces from Japan before any agreement
can be concluded.
As mentioned earlier, security plays a major role in
Soviet considerations regarding the northern territories.
Recent events in the Pacific Basin have altered the delicate
balance of peaceful coexistence between Soviet regional
factions and the new trilateral powers. A Soviet-Vietnamese
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, followed by Soviet
naval forces visiting the region, the Vietnamese invasion
into Kampuchea and the Chinese incursion into Vietnam have
significantly threatened the stability of this .region and
world peace.
From Subic Bay in the south through Taiwan, the Ryukyu
Islands, to the northern tip of Hokkaido, the United States
poses a threat to Russia's eastern front. In the Pacific
Basin there are no significant naval powers outside the
superpowers. A few, including Japan, may possess sufficient
forces to restrict or impede innocent passage through
strategically vital and narrow channels. But by controlling
the Kurile Island chain and the northern tip of Hokkaido,
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the Soviet Pacific Fleet and Russian merchant and fishing
fleets could assure themselves safe passage from mainland
bases into the Pacific without having to utilize any foreign
power controlled straits. With declining American presence
and corresponding Japanese defense capabilities, the Soviets
could soon enjoy a position of dominance once secured by
the United States.
The implication of these Soviet actions extends beyond
Northereast Asia. There may soon be indications that
Soviet military actions are indeed aiming at securing
warm water ports in Southeast Asia (from Kampuchea to the
Malaccan Strait is a very short distance) and Asia. With
the control of just two straits, Malacca and Hormuz , the
Russians could threaten the dominance of a major portion of
the industrial world. This action is not at all unrealistic
in light of a recent CIA report indicating that Soviet oil
production will drop soon and that there may be reserves
of oil in the adjacent waters of Southeast Asia. As in
the past, if Soviet diplomatic attempts to secure their
interest in these regions fail, then military action is
likely to prevail. In other words, if the carrot is not
taken, then the stick will be employed effectively.
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D. THE U. S. RESPONSE
In the Pacific Basin U. S. foreign policy has become so
atomized that it is in danger of becoming severely weakened.
The American government must not lose sight of reality.
Americans are confronting a gigantic military power that has
"...successfully harnessed the energies of their people
toward a single, well-defined and consistently articulated
goal - the achievement of a decisive degree of military
superiority over the West..."^° The Americans cannot forget
that communist ideology drives the Russian machine. The
inference that the Soviet Union is moving toward capitalism
is not true. Since 197Z the Soviets have backed wars and
revolutions in Angola, Ethiopia/Somalia, Afghanistan, South
Yemen, and conceivably Iran.
To deal effectively with the Soviet Union one must
operate on the same level and assume they are not about to
change their fundamental thinking in the future. The number
of years where relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union could be thought of as "good" are remarkably
few. Administration after administration has sought detente
or a limited peaceful coexistence in its own way. These
approaches to Soviet-American relations are marked by the
designations each Secretary of State has bestowed on their
philosophy toward these relationships: Dean Acheson's




It appears that in the Pacific Basin American foreign
policy has lost its compass. It is obvious that a nation
as great as the United States, in many respects a model
for much of the world, can ill afford to lose its will,





V. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT THE INDICATORS AND VARIABLES SUGGEST
Throughout Asia events of political instability,
economic and resource uncertainty in combination with
Soviet aggression have added new emphasis to Japan's
public debate of security related issues. The effect of
these factors on Japanese perceptions of military power as
a possible alternative for resource security has been a
factor leading to open discussion among many of the govern
mental officals and in much of the public sector. The
changes that may occur in the future as a result of this
increased consciousness toward security will have wide-
spread regional and global impact.
When and if these changes take place the United States
must be prepared to act in accordance with and not lose
sight of its vital national interests in this region. It
should be conveyed clearly to American allies that not all
interests in this region are vital to the survival of
America. The government of Japan should also realize
that for Japan, as a nation, to remain a vitally important
ally it must assume a greater responsibility and a more
positive approach toward the Japanese-American mutual
security system. American interests, as well as Japanese
interests, are at stake. U. S. armed forces in the region
are there to protect those interest in a prioritized
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fashion and their major responsibility is not to provide
for the defense of a large economic power that perceives
American forces as a canopy deployed for the benefit of
Japan.
Both nations must also analyze the changing strategic
environment of Asia with more realism while avoiding the
pit-falls of unfounded rhetoric. If the United States is
expecting Japan to increase its defensive capabilities then
it must be firm in this commitment in all areas of bilateral
relations and provide Japan with the necessary support:
and if Japanese perceive their survival as being in
jeopardy then they must be willing to pay the political
and economical price associated with security.
At the present time it is not possible to state
positively that Japan seeks to become a major independent
military force within the Pacific Basin region. From
the evidence presented however, it appears that a decision
on Japan's part to pursue a course of action less dependent
on the United States has been reached. It can be concluded
that Japan has been moving towards greater autonomy since
1973, when Japanese leaders clearly rejected their
uncritical acceptance of foreign policy objectives imposed
upon them by the Americans. Along with the defense relation-
ship that Japan and the United States share, the Japanese




This increasing detachment from the United States on
Japan's part, does not extend as deeply into the areas
of economics and security. The Japanese are still
heavily dependent on the United States in both of these
areas. Like many of Japan's policies, there are usually
clear distinctions between politics on one hand and
security and economics on the other. The lingering poli-
tical dependency on the United States is most likely
linked to Japan's perception of Soviet intentions in Asia
and the Soviet military build-up in the Pacific.
This growing perception of a Soviet threat has also
strengthened the right wing of the Liberal Democratic
Party and caught the interest of a powerful force in
Japan, business. Many of the business leaders of Japan
can perceive Japan as a regional arms producer/supplier
modeled after the nations of France and Israel. The market,
China, ASEAN and the Middle East (along with a variety of
resource rich third world nations) is one of high profit
potential and would serve both the defense needs of the
supplier and the client, while having altruistic conno-
tations by using the correct public relations campaign.
The first cautious step on this road towards indigenous
arms production for export has been taken. Government
to government cooperation and Japanese technology transfers
to the United States in the areas of cruise missiles and
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PGM guidance systems has set the precedence for future
overt military technology and equipment transfers. The
export barrier of the Japanese constitution has either
been reinterpreted or ignored.
Japan's potential as an arms producer/supplier is
enormous and could also enhance the natural trading patterns
between it and ASEAN. This trade could as well lessen
some of the pressure now exerted on Japan in the area of
scarce resources and would also dampen the threat per-
ception that some nations may have towards a rearmed
Japan. Claiming a neutralist position while a sufficient
defensive force is established, Japan could maintain a
high degree of armed readiness and military strength
while citing Switzerland as an example of a highly armed
nation that maintained a neutralist position in the world
through two wars
.
Although the evidence for the hypothesis that Japan
will overcome the political objections to accepting more
responsibility for its security and the associated economic
cost is merely beginning to accumulate, it must be remem-
bered that the Japanese approach new policy directions with
the utmost caution, while allowing ample maneuvering room
in all directions. It is likely that this new role for
Japan will be approached in the same manner. It can be
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anticipated that the Japanese will move slowly but surely
towards a position where they will make wider use of their
tremendous intellectual and economic potential in the




In any survey of literature on contemporary Japanese
foreign and domestic problems there are recurring factors
that are listed. This list is a summation of those factors
thought to be relevant to this work.
2 Paul F. Langer and Richard Moorsteen, The U, S./
Japanese Military Alliance: Japanese Perceptions and~the
Prospective Impact of Evolving U. S. Military Doctrines and
Technologies
,








4 Basically a statement of principles, the major points
are: to realize world peace by supporting the United Nations;
to stabilize the livelihood of the people, instill patriotism,
and establish a firm foundaiton for insuring the nation's
security; to consolidate defense power gradually and within
the limits necessary for defense in consonance with the
nation's ability to do so and the circumstances in which
the nation finds itself; and to rely on the Japan-U. S.
security treaty as a keystone for dealing with external
aggression until the time comes when the United Nations
can prevent aggression effectively. John K. Emmerson and
Leonard A. Humphreys, Will Japan Rearm (AEI -Hoover Policy
Study 9, Washington, D. C. , 1973 ) p. 20.
Defense of Japan, (Japanese Defense Agency, Tokyo)
,
July 1978, p. 50.






1979 figures from: "Japan' s Defense: Call to Arms,"
Far East Economic Review
,
March 14, 1980, p. 21. Public




Public discussion of defense related topics and support
for the U. S. -Japanese treaty and the SDF have never been
stronger in recent history. The public support for the M.S.T.
has almost doubled since 1974. This support has led the
way for qualitative improvements in the SDF and a revival
of militaristic and traditional values. "Japan's Growing
Strategic Role," Aviation Week ^ Space Technology , Jan 14,
1980, p. 36. "Japan's Defense," Far East Economic Review
,
March 14, 1980, p. 21.
o
The leader of the Federation of Employees' Associations,
Takeoki Sakurada (and a close friend of P. M. Ohira)
recently stated in the Far East Economic Review that "Japan
should produce more defense arms itself. . ." and the Committee
on Defense and Production asked for a doubling of expen-
ditures in defense related research and development programs.
This would indicate a need or function for the military
on at least a domestic level if not an international level.
"Japan's Defense," Far East Economic Review , March 14, 1980,
p. 21
.
9 During 1976 Soviet air activity increased four-fold
in the number oif "Tokyo express" flights and the Soviet air
activity in general became more diversified. Flights
requiring mid-air refueling were increased, low altitude
approaches to Japan were increased and electronic counter-
measures were employed more frequently.
A more detailed explanation of the Yamato clan god
can be found by referring to: Nobutaka Ike, Japan: The New
Superstate
,
freeman and Co., San Francisco, 1973}, and
Guilford A. Dudley, A History of Eastern Civilizations
,
(Wiley and Son, Inc., New York, 1973J .
Over the years since the defeat of World War II, the
Japanese have gained back the self-respect that they once
had. More and more the Japanese think of themselves as
being superior to other nationalities. A Japanese character
study by Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemums and the Sword
(Boston: Houghton Miffin"] 1946) brings out these and other
personality traits of the Japanese.
12
"Japanese Tours Oil Countries," The New York Times
,
January 15, 1978, p. 34, col. 4.
13 Journal of Commerce
,
Information Bank of the New
York Times Company, June 16, 1978, p. 1, col. 6.
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^^ New York Times
,
August 6, 1978, p. 1.
In the Far East Economic Review of March 14, 1980,
p. 18 reported that Japan had exceeded the 1% level of GNP
by 0.5%, a first in the past decade. However, this uses
a different method of accounting.
Far East Economic Review
,
March 14, 1980, p. 53.
17 From 1974 to 1978 the Japanese defense budget rose
40%, Senate Sub-Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs , 1978.
The figures for 1979 are comparable to those of 1978.
1
8
The reality of this situation can be expressed by facts
such as: Japanese tankers, spaced twenty to fifty miles
apart, stretch in an unbroken chain from Japanese territorial
waters to the Persian Gulf. Japanese tankers depart Indonesian
ports every five hours, twenty-four hours a day, en route to
Japan. One- third of Japan's exports/imports go through the
Malaccan Straits or the Lombok Straits. Asia Pacific
Community , Winter 1978-79, p. 27; Parameters , Sept. 1978, p. 18
19 An excellent study entitled, Japan: Economic Growth, .
Resources Scarcity and Environmental "Constraints
,
By
Edward A. Olsen (Westview Press, 1978) is credited for the
basic economic aspects to these options. Mr. Olsen does a
fine job of stating the options facing Japan today, to
which I added little, although I do disagree with him on
the option Japan is likely to pursue in the long run.
20 Eliot Janeway in a revent New York Times article
entitled, "The Oil Shortage is a Malthusian Myth," stated
that Japanese inventories of oil are presently at 102 days.
It is assumed that other inventories of scarce resources





In 1938 Japan proclaimed a new order in East Asia
that was anti -Communist . It included Manchukuo and China
under Japanese hegemony and was extended to the "Greater
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." This area would be
economically self-sufficient and free from Western exploi-
tation. Other examples of Japanese military action as
national policy are: Sino- Japanese War of 1894-95, the
Russo-Japanese War of 1905, and Japanese colonialism in
Taiwan and Korea in the late 19th Century. It is interesting
to note that the Japanese, in both the cases of Russia and
China, led surprise attacks against them.
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23 Kurisu was fired in 1978 for numerous reasons - the
most serious being publicly pointing out serious gaps in
Japan's defenses. Far East Economic Review, March 14, 1980,
p. 19; Aviation WeeF and Space Technology , January 14, 1980,
p. 40.
24
Foreign Policy , Winter 1978-79, p. 16.
2R
Rand Study R-1030-ISA, "Japanese National Security
Policy - Domestic Determinate," by Paul F. Langer,
June 19 72, p. 64.
7 ft
There are numerous books available on this subject.
Three recent publications found were extremely interesting,
Tagdish N. Bhagwati, The New International Economic Order:
The North-South Debate
, 1978; Stanley Hoffman, Primacy or
World Order: American Foreign Policy Since the Cold War
,
19 78; and William Irwin Thompson, Evil and World Order , 1976
27 Figures here would not be an accurate indication of
Japan's dependency because they vary with the source used.
It can be said with reasonable certainty that the Japanese
are "totally" dependent on foreign sources for petroleum,
bauxite, nickel ore, platinum, palladium, rhodium, aluminum,
iron ore and uranium.
28
In 1979 Japan increased its petroleum "consumption,"
now purchasing about 30% of the available world exports of
oil. Source: Asian Survey
, January 1980, p. 44.
29 Defense of Japan
,
Q^apanese Defense Agency: Tokyo,
July 197Tr
30 The interview took place in Tokyo and was reported in
The Christian Science Monitor
,
July 19, 1978, p. 9.
(Underlining is added)
31Aviation Week and Space Technology stated that in
1978 the guidelines for this proposal were first approved
and the conclusion of the agreement came out in a later
article. Aviation Week and Space Technology
,
January 14,
1980, p. 36 and February 11, 1980, p. 9.
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32 Japan has for many years been able to transfer numerous
items that were politically acceptable as exports that did
not violate its governmental policies on arms transfers, but
items that did have potential use as military weapons, e.g.,
high grade tempered steel pipe, transfered to the PRC.
33
It should be noted that Switzerland has maintained its
neutral position in the world through a high degree of
armament and military readiness.
Extensive arms control studies have recently been
completed on the use of PGMs resulting from the Yom Kippur
War of 1973. Two studies that address arms in general, and
PGMs in detail, are: Ann Hessing Cahn, et al , Controlling
Future Arms Trade (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980's Project,
Council on Foreign Relations, 1977); and James H. Noyes
,
The Clouded Lens (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution
Press, Persian Gulf Security and U. S. Policy, 1979).
35
36
Far East Economic Review, March 14, 1980, p. 57.
The Japanese economy is just starting to recover from
a recession that started in late 1976. In 1977 twelve
Japanese shipyards went bankrupt when export orders fell
401. At that time there were about 1.2 million unemployed
in Japan and this figure rose to nearly 2 million in late
1978. It is interesting to note that during the recession
the Shipbuilding Association of Japan proposed to the
Japanese government a plan to scrap vessels older than 15
years, and increase the military purchases of ships.
Source: The Financial Times
,
February 14, 1978, p. 16
and The Economist of London
,
August 19, 1978, p. 50.
37 Two papers that offer a more detailed account of
French arms sales and production factors/determinants are:
"Behin.d French Arms Sales" by Capt. M. E. Walsh, December 1977,
and "Determinants of French Arms Sales Behavior: Implications
for National and International Security" by Edward A.
Kolodziej of the University of Illinois. Neither of these
papers is known to have been published.
38
Dr. Henry Kissinger has perceived the potential for
this and stated so. He remarked in July 1979 that the flow
of history is going to leave Europe behind and shift to
the Pacific region. He also stated in American Foreign
Policy (1977) p. 427, that, "...the impulse for regional
integration (in Asia) is apparent..."
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39 These benefits were paraphrased from a French slogan
in 1973, explaining the reasons for arms exports. The
slogan is from Ventes d'armes: Une Politique , by Jean-
Francois Dubou (1974) -p] 146 . English translation taken
from Walsh, "Behind French Arms Sales."
^^ Orbis
,
Summer 1977, p. 198.
41 The Financial Times featured many surveys in 1978 and
1979 that pointed out the economic prosperity of the Asian
region. One article of interest concerns Japanese-South





"Japan Feels the Heat in the Industrial Kitchen,"
World Business Weekly
,
April 7, 1980, p. 22.
43 Just examining the 1980 budget, this figure of $9.7
billion equates to 5.4% of the national budget. If one
compares the years 1977 and 1980 one finds a 59?; increase
in defense spending (1977: $5.7 billion, 1980: $9.7 billion).
Base figures compiled from Aviation Week and Space Technology
,






45 An extensive survey of Japan's nuclear capabilities
can be found in John E. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option:
Political, Technical and Strategic Factors , 1975, pp. 116-117.
There are now over 25 plants in operation, under





Summer 1977, p. 198.
4 8
The toppling of Premier Nasayoshi Ohira's government
on 16 May 1980 adds a degree of uncertainty to the five-
year defense plan that detailed the Japanese Defense
Agency's modernization program. The plan called for a $12.5
billion procurement program among the three military ser-
vices. It is of interest to note that the announcement of
the program came at virtually the same time of the Diet's
no confidence vote on Ohira.
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49 Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest
(Princeton University Press , 1978)
,
p. TTT.
^^ Los Angeles Times , April 25, 1979.
Lucian Pye expressed this idea at the 33rd Annual
Conference of the World Affairs Council of Northern
California, May 4-6, 1979.
52
Los Angeles Times , August 19, 1979, p. 1.
53 New York Times , August 6, 1978, p. 12; Foreign
Policy , Winter 78-79, Michael Pillsbury article, p. 9.
54 Two-thirds of South Korea's foreign trade is with
Japan and 40% of North Korea's current debt is owed to
Japan, Franklin R. Weinstein, U.S. -Japan Relations and




U. S. Congress Committee
on Commerce, 1976, p. 289. Of these 121 straits, only
five are of major importance: Strait of Mallacca, Drake
Passages, Strait of Gibraltar, Strait of Hormuz and
Tsushima Straits.
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